BGP pre x hijacking is a threat to Internet operators and users. Several mechanisms or modi cations to BGP that protect the Internet against it have been proposed. However, the reality is that most operators have not deployed them and are reluctant to do so in the near future. Instead, they rely on basic -and often ine cient-proactive defenses to reduce the impact of hijacking events, or on detection based on third party services and reactive approaches that might take up to several hours. In this work, we present the results of a survey we conducted among 75 network operators to study: (a) the operators' awareness of BGP pre x hijacking attacks, (b) presently used defenses (if any) against BGP prex hijacking, (c) the willingness to adopt new defense mechanisms, and (d) reasons that may hinder the deployment of BGP pre x hijacking defenses. We expect the ndings of this survey to increase the understanding of existing BGP hijacking defenses and the needs of network operators, as well as contribute towards designing new defense mechanisms that satisfy the requirements of the operators.
INTRODUCTION
The Internet is composed of tens of thousands of interconnected Autonomous Systems (ASes), which are networks belonging to di erent administrative entities. ASes use the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [16] to advertise address space (as IPv4/IPv6 network pre xes) and establish interdomain routes in the Internet. BGP is a distributed protocol, lacking authentication of advertised routes. As a result, an AS is able to advertise illegitimate routes for IP pre xes it does not own. These advertisements propagate and "pollute" many ASes, or even the entire Internet, a ecting service availability, integrity, and con dentiality of communications. This phenomenon, called BGP pre x hijacking, is frequently observed [27] , and can be caused by router miscongurations [1, 2] or malicious attacks [3, 23, 27] .
Current defenses are not su cient. Currently, networks rely on practical reactive mechanisms to defend against prex hijacking, since proactive mechanisms such as RPKI [17] [18] [19] [20] 26] are fully e cient only when globally deployed 1 , and operators are reluctant to deploy them due to associated technical and nancial costs [12, 13, 15, 21, 22] . Reactive mechanisms mainly operate in two stages: detection (e.g., based on monitoring data) and mitigation (e.g., based on local network actions, such as originating BGP advertisements) of the hijack. The speed of the reactive defenses is crucial; even short-lived events can have severe consequences [3] . However, the reality shows that, currently, hijacking events are not quickly mitigated. For instance, back in 2008, a hijacking event a ected YouTube's pre xes and disrupted its services for 2 hours [11] . More recently, in Sep. 2016, BackConnect (AS203959) hijacked, at di erent times, several ASes; the events lasted for several hours [4] . In Jan. 2017, the Iranian state telecom TIC hijacked disparate pornographic websites for more than a day [5] . In Apr. 2017, nancial services, like Visa and Mastercard, and security companies, like Symantec, were hijacked by a Russian company for seven minutes [6] . In Aug. 2017, an accidental hijack (route leak) from Google led to a large-scale internet disruption that slowed or blocked access to websites and online services for dozens of Japanese companies for ten minutes [7] . In Dec. 2017, 80 pre xes normally announced by high-pro le organizations such as Google, Apple, Facebook, Microsoft and others were wrongly re-routed to a newly assigned Russian AS for several minutes [8] .
Survey motivation and contributions. To surpass existing shortcomings and achieve e cient resolution of hijacking events, new defense approaches that t the needs and requirements of the operators are needed. We launched a survey [10] to increase the understanding of currently used BGP hijacking defenses, and to receive feedback directly from network operators about their needs. We acquired valuable information from this survey that is useful to design defense systems that overcome existing issues in terms of e ciency and deployability.
However, the ndings of the survey are more general and can be bene cial for both researchers and operators. Researchers can evaluate the severity of the problem of BGP pre x hijacking as it is seen from the operator community, and investigate new defense mechanisms capitalizing on current operational practices. Operators can be informed about the trends in the BGP pre x hijacking issue and the employed defenses, provide valuable feedback to the network community themselves, and adjust accordingly the way they manage and protect their networks against hijacks.
Structure. In Section 2 we present the questions of the survey, and in Section 3 we discuss the main ndings and their implications.
SURVEY PROFILE AND QUESTIONS
We launched a survey [10] on network operators' mailing lists, such as NANOG and RIPE. The survey is anonymous and comprises 21 questions studying (a) the operators' awareness of BGP pre x hijacking attacks, (b) presently used defenses against BGP pre x hijacking, (c) the willingness to adopt new defense mechanisms, and (d) reasons that may hinder the deployment of BGP pre x hijacking defenses. We received answers from 75 participants operating a broad variety of networks all over the world, working at di erent positions (engineering, management, etc.).
The survey/questionnaire is composed of three parts.
(1) Information about the participants and their organizations. In the rst part we ask the participants to provide information about the type (e.g., ISP, CDN) and location of their organization. Fig. 1 presents the results.
(2) Knowledge and Experience with BGP Pre x Hijacking. The second part consists of questions related to the participants' awareness and concern about BGP pre x hijacking, including their experience with past hijacking events on their networks. Note that an organization might be characterized by more than one terms and operate in many continents.
against BGP pre x hijacking, such as RPKI, (ii) how they detect and mitigate a hijacking event a ecting their pre xes, and (iii) the characteristics they consider desirable (or not) in a future defense (detection/mitigation) system. A detailed presentation of the survey questions and answers is provided as supplementary material (also available in [25] ).
SURVEY RESULTS
We classify the survey ndings in 4 categories, which we present in the following sections: (i) evaluation of impact of hijacks (Section 3.1), (ii) general information about current defense mechanisms employed against hijacks (Section 3.2), (iii) speci c information on the detection and mitigation stages in today's operations (Section 3.3), and (iv) requirements posed on new mitigation mechanisms (e.g., involving outsourcing defense functionality to third parties), as well as the willingness of operators to adopt them (Section 3.4).
Impact of Hijacks
BGP pre x hijacking is a real threat and concerns network operators. More than 40% of the operators reported that their organization has been a victim of a hijack in the past. Moreover, the vast majority is concerned about BGP pre x hijacking in the Internet and its potential impact on their own networks. Almost all operators are knowledgeable on the issue of hijacks and the involved mechanisms.
Hijacks have a severe and lasting impact. Operators evaluate the impact of a potential hijack targeting their network (in terms of duration and number of disrupted services) as shown in Table 1 . The vast majority (76%) expects the impact of a hijack to last for a long time (few hours or more), while opinions are divided on whether the hijack will affect a few or many of their services/clients, indicating that there are concerns both for extended (e.g., route leaks) and limited/targeted (e.g., malicious attacks) hijacks. Moreover, their past experience (Fig. 2) shows that most hijacks indeed lasted long: more than 57% of hijacks lasted more than an hour, while 25% lasted more than a day; around 28% are short-term hijacks, lasting a few minutes (14.3%) or seconds (14.3%). 
Defenses against Hijacks
RPKI deployment is limited. In accordance with previous studies [14] , most of the network operators (71%) answered that they have not deployed RPKI as a proactive defense mechanism in their networks (Fig. 3(a) ); very few (12%) use the full functionality of RPKI (Route Origin Authorisation -ROA and Route Origin Validation -ROV). There are various reasons for this, as shown in Fig. 3(b) ; deployment lags mainly due to RPKI's limited adoption and little security bene ts, but also due to the increased CAPEX and OPEX costs, and increased complexity and processing overhead associated with the protocol mechanisms. Therefore, about 60% of the operators replied that they resort to other mechanisms and practical defenses to protect their networks against BGP hijacks. Fig. 4 . The majority of the participants, i.e., 17 networks (among those who provided answers for this optional question), use route ltering as a proactive defense to protect their own and their customers' pre xes from being hijacked. Route ltering is implemented in various ways (based on their answers) including for example: pre x origin (e.g., from IRR records) or AS-path ltering; ltering at edge routers (with customers/peers) or route servers (at IXPs). Less popular approaches are anycast (2 answers) and pre x de-aggregation (4 answers). Finally, 5 operators (from CDNs or tier-1 networks) mention that they peer with many other networks extensively; this helps them protect their networks from hijacking events (i.e., by reducing their impact). 
Detection and Mitigation of Hijacks
Hijack detection mainly relies on third parties. The majority of networks (61.3%) use a third party detection service, which noti es them about hijacking incidents against their pre xes, as shown in Fig. 5(a) . BGPmon [9] is the most popular detection service among the answers in our survey. The satisfaction of operators from third parties generally varies a lot; some use them because they are satis ed and others because there are no alternatives (e.g., it is not possible to develop their own detection service) 2 . Moreover, 17.3% of networks also practically rely on third parties, since they expect to get noti ed about a hijack by receiving noti cation from colleagues, clients, mailing lists, etc. In total, 78.6% of the networks rely on third parties for the detection of hijacks against their pre xes. About one third of the networks have deployed a local hijack detection mechanism (e.g., by monitoring the disruption of their services) 3 . Finally, a nonnegligible percentage of 8% would probably not learn about a hijack. Mitigating through de-aggregation and contacting other networks. Asking operators what would be the countermeasures they would take to mitigate a pre x hijacking 4 (see Fig. 5(b) ), the majority (62.7%) responded that they would announce more speci c pre xes (de-aggregation) and contact the o ending network (i.e., the hijacker) or its providers. 5.3% would follow only the former approach (de-aggregation) and 25.3% only the latter (contacting other operators). This indicates that although de-aggregation is not widely used currently (see Fig. 4 ), operators still nd it a good solution and are willing to proceed to similar actions after a hijacking event -a ecting their networks-has taken place.
New Mitigation Mechanisms
The survey results show that the main practices that networks currently use for hijack mitigation comprise pre x deaggregation and contacting other networks (Fig. 4 and 5(b) ). Since these approaches have some important shortcomings, e.g., de-aggregation is not e cient when a /24 pre x is hijacked (due to upstream ltering), and contacting network operators is usually done manually and thus adds signicant delay to the mitigation process, we ask the network operators about their willingness to deploy new mitigation mechanisms, as well as what desired characteristics these mechanisms should possess. We rst ask them about their willingness to outsource functions related to the detection and mitigation of hijacks to a third party, in order to enhance their defenses. 61% of the operators are not willing to proceed to such outsourcing practices. This shows that a potential mechanism should not be entirely based on outsourcing, since this would not be acceptable by many networks. Flexible approaches that could be operated in two modes, i.e., self-operated and outsourced, could be promising, since a signi cant percentage of 39% does not reject the possibility to outsource such functions.
The reasons for the operators' reluctance to outsource are given in Fig. 6(a) , where the associated (high) cost and the need to share private information about their network are the main factors. Administrative and technical overhead may also prevent outsourcing. This is a rst indication about the characteristics of a potential defense system: low cost, privacy-preserving, and easy to operate and manage. More speci c results about what would be the information/control that they would not be willing to share/allow with an outsourcing organization, are given in Fig. 6(b) . As it can be seen, most of them are willing to share information about their pre xes and AS-neighbors (95%), as well as their routing policies (80%). A smaller percentage would allow BGP announcements to be controlled or implemented by the outsourcing organization.
Finally, according to operators, the importance of di erent characteristics that a hijack defense system should have, is shown in Fig. 7 , where the rightmost characteristics are considered of the highest importance. The speed and e ectiveness of the mitigation stage, as well as the self-operability and low cost and management overhead, are the highestranked characteristics. Moreover, the detection stage is required to generate few false positives, which indicates the need for high levels of detection accuracy. 
CONCLUSION
In this work, to increase community understanding of existing BGP hijacking defenses and the needs of network operators, we presented the results of a survey of 75 network operators around the world. Through the survey, we veri ed our intuition that BGP pre x hijacking is a real threat and concerns the vast majority of network operators; in fact, hijacks can have a severe and lasting impact on their own networks. In the context of combatting such hijacks, operators can use proactive or reactive techniques. On the one hand, proactive mechanisms, such as RPKI, have gained extremely little traction for multiple reasons, including limited adoption and high cost and complexity of deployment. On the other hand, practical reactive defenses such as contacting other networks, route ltering, extensive peering and pre x de-aggregation are usually preferred methods to mitigate hijacks; however, each has its own signi cant limitations, ranging from very slow mitigation speeds (e.g., contacting other operators) to ine cient mitigation (e.g., de-aggregation for /24 pre xes).
In terms of detection, we observe that operators mainly rely on third parties, such as BGPmon. However, the level of satisfaction varies wildly across operators. Moreover, most of them are reluctant to perform similar outsourcing for the mitigation of the hijacks themselves; in fact, there are mixed feelings about the kind and amount of information they would be willing to disclose to the third party, as well as the involved costs and technical and administrative overhead. The speed and e ectiveness of the mitigation stage, as well as the self-operability and low cost and management overhead, are of paramount importance; moreover, the detection stage is required to generate few false positives, mandating high levels of detection accuracy. The ndings of this survey could inform the design and implementation of new concepts and methodologies, as well as more secure inter-domain routing protocols in general.
